The 2013 horsemeat scandal shone a bright light on some of the darkest corners of supply chain governance across the European Union, revealing a "blind spot" in current EU food law.
effectively integrated from the perspective of economic operators exploiting free movement than it is from the perspective of administrative agencies charged with applying the rules regulating the market.
States can of course prevent the import of foods from other Member States on health grounds under Article 36 TFEU. The protection of human health is one of the most frequently invoked derogations to the EU's free movement rules, with the CJEU recognising that the "health and life of humans rank foremost among the property interests protected by Article reason for its withdrawal, and if necessary, recall from consumers, products already supplied to them when other measures are not sufficient to achieve a high level of health protection.
Similar obligations apply to retailers and distributors under Article 19(2). They must also initiate procedures to withdraw from the market, products not in compliance with the food safety requirements and must pass on all relevant information necessary to trace food. This process is assisted through the rules on traceability. Food business operators (FBOs) must ensure the traceability of the food at all stages of production, processing and labelling. 27 Food must also be adequately labelled or identified to facilitate its traceability and accompanied by a delivery note. 28 Finally, it is the Member States which must enforce food law and monitor and verify that the relevant requirements of food law are fulfilled by FBOs at all stages of production, processing and distribution. The issue of enforcement raises interesting questions about the division of competences between the various regulatory bodies. This will be discussed further below.
In addition to setting out the objectives of food law and the responsibilities of operators the General Food Regulation makes provision for a rapid alert system for food and feed (RASFF). This system, which was first established in 1979, provides that when a Member State has any information about a serious health risk deriving from food or feed, it must immediately notify the European Commission. 29 In particular, RASFF members must notify the Commission when measures such as the withdrawal or recall of food are taken in order to protect consumer health and if rapid action is required. Members must also notify the Commission if they have concluded, in consultation with operators that food or feed should not be placed on the market if that measure is taken on account of a serious risk. The same applies when the product in question is placed on the market under conditions. The
Regulation gives the Commission the power to take emergency measures if the risk cannot be satisfactorily contained by the Member States. 30 Generally, the Commission is assisted by the comitology committee, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, composed of representatives of the Member States.
31 27 Ibid., at art 18. 28 Ibid., at art 18(4). 29 Ibid., at art 50. See also Commission Regulation No 16/2011 (OJ 2011 L 6 p.7) and <http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm. > accessed 20 May 2016. 30 Ibid., at art 53(1). 31 Subsequently renamed the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed.
body which provides scientific advice and communication on existing and emerging risks, in close collaboration with the Member States and in consultation with stakeholders. Its role is as risk assessor. It provides scientific advice in order to enable the EU's regulatory
Authorities to take effective risk management decisions. 33 One of the major difficulties faced by EFSA in its assessment is the wide thematic scope for the identification of emerging risks.
Lawless points to several factors which have been highlighted by the Stakeholders'
Consultative Group on Emerging Risks. Such factors include social and economic developments-notably pressure for costs reduction, changes in human lifestyle or diet-such as new foods and food preparations and analytical developments including the detection of new low levels of contaminants which cannot be adequately risk assessed. Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, he identifies changes in the operation and functioning of the food chain, notably more globalised and longer transportation chains, different regulatory controls and standards and issues of food security.
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C. Other Relevant Secondary Legislation
In addition to the General Food Regulation, there are a number of other pieces of EU secondary legislation which came into play during the horsemeat scandal, The FSAI used advance testing methods which had not been routinely used before.
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The survey consisted of the sampling of meat at retail level using DNA-based analytical techniques to differentiate between animal species. 43 The results showed that some of the products labelled as beef actually contained horse and pig DNA. Of the 27 beef products tested, 37 per cent. were found to contain horsemeat and 85 per cent. contained pig meat. In the majority of the samples taken, apart from the Tesco beef burger, with 29 per cent. horse, horse DNA was found at very low levels. 44 The Irish investigation concluded that the equine DNA found in the consignments of frozen beef products (beef trimmings) was labelled as originating from an EU-approved plant in Poland. This product had been used as a raw material in the burgers produced by Silvercrest Meats. 45 This material had arrived at the company through traders in both Ireland and the UK. Additional testing at Silvercrest found horsemeat in Polish labelled ingredients ranging from 4.1 per cent. to 37.8 per cent. The
Report found that there was no evidence that Silvercrest had deliberately passed off horsemeat as beef but the company was criticised for not respecting customer specifications as to approved suppliers. Silvercrest was not, however, alone and the initial Irish investigation subsequently implicated a number of additional companies.
Particular concern was expressed about the activities of traders and intermediaries. The company continued to source its products from the same suppliers even after the contamination had been found. 48 Another company, B&F Meats was found to have dispatched horse meat to a single customer in the Czech Republic via a UK trader using a Czech label which referred to "beef".
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The Irish Authorities not only participated in the EU follow up action (considered below) but it also held meetings with industry representatives and agreed a protocol for a more wide-ranging testing of beef products for adulteration. It was decided to test a number of food categories, namely pre-packaged beef products offered to consumers or caterers, nonpre-packaged beef products offered to consumers or caterers, and finally meat ingredients used in processed beef products. 50 The first set of results which were published in March 2013 showed that the majority of the 957 products tested-apart from those already found to be positive-did not contain horsemeat. As to the type of meat which had been adulterated, the Irish Report concluded that it concerned mainly "manufacturing beef product", that is to say beef used for further processing, such as frozen or manufactured beef products including burgers and minced meat. 51 The type of products involved made the task of the regulatory authorities all the more complicated and may have played a significant role in facilitating the adulteration. As the Irish Report remarks, "multiple ingredients from some 40 suppliers (many supplying a variety of raw ingredient products) were used in production batches and the mixture of ingredients could vary in every half hour production batch".
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The Irish investigation was followed by an inquiry in the UK conducted by the Food 
III. WHAT WENT WRONG?
So why then did the EU's regulatory system fail and why did horsemeat, some of it contaminated, get into the food chain? It appears that a number of factors, at both a domestic and EU level, coalesced to help create the crisis. This section will deal with these factors in turn.
A. The Domestic Level
In the case of the UK, the first cause of the crisis was the unsatisfactory division of competences between the regulators. Concern was expressed in both the written and oral evidence presented to the UK House of Commons Environment Select Committee about the fragmented nature of the UK Government bodies with responsibility in this field. According to the consumer organisation Which?, "food issues in practice do not break down into the simple delineations that are made between government departments". 63 This fragmentation largely resulted from the Machinery of Government changes which had been introduced by the coalition Government in July 2010. As a result of these changes, the FSA is exclusively responsible for food safety in England, although it has delegated enforcement responsibilities to the local authorities. However, it no longer holds responsibility for food composition, origin labelling and authenticity which were moved to the Environment Department (Defra).
To add to the confusion, Defra is responsible for food composition policy but has delegated enforcement to the FSA. According to Lord Rooker, CEO of the FSA, labelling is "not really for us, because it is not a food safety issue". 64 This approach also goes against the increasing recognition that "the best outcomes are guaranteed not by having animal health officers focus only on animal production, environmental experts only on environmental contamination, and public health officers only on food hygiene. Rather, organizations and governments are recognizing that integration and collaboration are key to an effective food chain approach". 65 The UK Environment Select Committee concluded that "the FSA's diminished role has led to a lack of clarity about where responsibility lies, and this has weakened the UK's ability to identify and respond to food standards concerns. Furthermore, the current contamination crisis has caught the FSA and Government flat-footed and unable to respond effectively within structures designed primarily to respond to threats to human health".
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The second factor was that there had been awareness in industry circles that adulteration was taking place long before the scandal unfolded but, at least in the case of QK Cold Meats, they had not taken action. This Irish company had been testing for equine DNA for some time and had found positive results without informing the appropriate authorities.
Further bad practice among suppliers was evident, with, as already mentioned, the Irish Report finding that certain companies had disrespected customer specifications only to use approved suppliers. This was the case with Silvercrest, whose parent company, ABP was found to have failed to maintain proper oversight of its subsidiary. According to Tim Smith, Technical Director of Tesco, it was the suppliers and not the retailers who deviated from approved supply chains: "the fact is that Silvercrest, for whatever reason, chose to use suppliers that we had not approved and audited (…) If somebody chooses to step outside that process deliberately, for whatever commercial reason, then it is impossible to check a supplier in Poland, which we do not even know exists". is through customs and inside the single market, much of it is being passed off as beef". 68 As the Irish Report noted, companies could purchase the raw material from Poland at EUR 400 per tonne less than the price of corresponding beef trimmings available in Ireland. 66 Ibid., at para. 19. 67 Ibid., at para. 11. 68 J. Forsyth, "The horsemeat scandal shows the true extent of Europe's power in Britain" The Spectator 16 February 2013.
Not only was there the financial incentive to commit fraud, but there was also economic pressure being placed on retailers. Indeed, competitive supermarket pricing can be said to be a primary motivator in utilising imported materials in the manufacturing process.
The UK National Farmers Union highlighted their concern that the "integrity of beef products has been compromised by using cheaper imported sources of meat". 69 Supply chains and costs are both linked to the type of meat involved. The British Meat Processors Association suggested that "modern food supply chains can be complex, with many handoffs, particularly in the case of more highly processed products, and raw materials, ingredients and final products are increasingly traded internationally". 70 Economy beef burgers sold in the UK need only contain 47 per cent. beef, which itself may also contain added bovine collagen and fat. Permitted ingredients include water, additional protein (filler), additives and seasonings.
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Although the supermarkets in their evidence before the UK Select Committee emphasised that their safety checks are not influenced by the type of meat involved, it seems apparent that cheaper processed meat is much more easily adulterated.
The third factor as concluded by the UK's Environment Select Committee, in its initial
Report delivered in the immediate aftermath of the scandal, was that the current arrangements for testing and control across the European food industry have failed UK consumers. Member
State regulatory authorities were simply not looking for horsemeat as it was not on their radar. The FSA confirmed that it tests on a risk assessment basis. Horsemeat was not considered a large adulteration risk and so it was not being tested for. In addition, cuts to local authority budgets in the UK have also had an impact. The scale of the task placed on national regulators is all the more challenging in that domestic regulation has to deal with the inter-EU scale of the trade. In its recent Report, tracking enforcement activity over the past five years, the FSA confirmed that many councils are failing to meet their obligations. 72 In fact, in this five year period-which includes the horsemeat scandal-the number of tests for adulteration or mislabelling had actually fallen by six per cent. Of particular concern is the drop in the random sampling of food. The decline in interventions may be attributed in part to a 17 per cent. fall in the number of environmental health inspectors since 2010. In a letter to George Osborne, a number of leading food safety experts have noted that since the horsemeat crisis, far from supporting further testing, the Government has required the FSA to make 69 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee -Eighth Report on Contamination of Beef Products, at para. 6. 70 Ibid., at para. 7. 71 Ibid., at para. 
B. The EU Level
The first, and in our view the most important, factor in the crisis was the Union's inability to deal with the fraudulent practices which lay at the heart of the horsemeat scandal. The EU's food control regime was simply not designed to deal with issues of food fraud as opposed to food safety. Indeed, it may be argued that EU food law actually supports, albeit unintentionally, food fraud, due to the manner in which free movement rules have been Environmental Health noted in its evidence to the UK Select Committee, although there were initially no health concerns "it seems improbable that individuals prepared to pass horse meat off as beef illegally are applying the high hygiene standards rightly required in the food production industry". 75 Food authenticity is not the primary focus of RASFF and so it was not initially triggered. As we shall see, the Commission is currently in the process of developing a system, similar to RASFF, which will be dedicated to the prevention of food fraud.
Perhaps the most obvious-but understandable-weakness in the EU regulations is that although the Union legislates, enforcement is left to the Member States. import meat". 89 He knew little about the company with whom he worked. One interpretation of this was that free trade was the norm and that businesses placed blind trust in other EU companies on the presumption that they would be working to the same standards. This suggests that free movement has become an article of faith which should not be challenged.
The EU free movement rules also had a role to play in facilitating complex supply chains. The rules undoubtedly made it much easier to move meat across the EU and this provided a rich context in which a network of middlemen and traders could get involved.
Indeed, the manner in which goods are produced and brokered means that suppliers do not always take possession of the products. As the Irish Report concluded, "the involvement of traders has been highlighted in so far as they are effectively part of the food chain, but in some instances [they] do not appear to be fulfilling the obligations of food business operators".
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Unlike domestic (EU) products, food imports from countries outside the Union can be subject to checks by local and port health authorities at Member State ports to ensure they comply with EU food law. Imports to the EU of meat and other products of animal origin from outside the EU must be pre-notified and must enter a Member State at designated Border Inspection Posts where they are subject to veterinary checks to ensure import conditions have been met. There are currently 250 to 300 Border Inspection Posts in the EU which carry out identity, physical and documentary checks on third country imports of meat and additional checks if fraud is suspected. All consignments are subject to documentary and identity checks and a prescribed percentage of consignments are subject to physical checks.
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If problems are found with Third Country products, information exchanges follow between the Member States (information on non-compliant products is shared through the TRACESthe EU Commission Trade Control and Expert System) and the next ten consignments entering the EU from that Third Country or establishment are held at port while results are awaited.
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In conclusion, we cannot say that the EU's food regulation regime or the rules in Article 34 TFEU were the cause of the horsemeat scandal. However, the emphasis on food safety simply made regulators blind to the extent of food fraud taking place across the Union. We can also say that the Single Market may have incentivised the fraud as those involved had access to a larger market. The price competition caused by the Internal Market also seems to have been an incentive to seek cheaper products in other Member States. The free movement of goods certainly seems to be a problem to the extent that once the goods are in the EU, blind faith is placed on the quality of the products. In this respect, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the EU rules, rather than exacerbating the fraud, simply amplified the extent to which it could occur.
IV. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE SINCE?
A. The Legislative Response
So we have seen the genesis of the crisis and we have considered how the EU regime of free issue of food fraud. 93 This Regulation replaces and combines into one piece of legislation previous labelling rules. 94 It introduces the mandatory display of nutritional information on processed foods and the mandatory origin labelling of unprocessed meat from pigs, sheep, goats and poultry. 95 Article 26(3) provides that where the origin of a food is given and where this origin is not the same as that of its primary ingredient, the origin of the primary ingredient must also be provided or be indicated as being different from that of the food. 96 The Regulation entered into effect on 13 December 2014 and is intended to ensure that consumers receive clearer, more comprehensive and accurate information on food content and can therefore make more informed choices about what they eat. The mandatory nutritional labelling for processed food will only apply from 13 December 2016. FBOs have been given three years to ensure a smooth transition towards the new labelling regime for pre-packed and non-pre-packed foods. In addition, the Regulation provides for the exhaustion of stocks of foods placed on the market or labelled before 13 December 2014. As of 1 April 2015, with some exemptions, the Member State or third country where the animal was reared and slaughtered will appear on the label of such meats. For foods bearing origin indications, the country of origin or place of provenance of the main ingredients must also be listed if those ingredients originate from a different place than the declared origin of the finished product.
According to the Commission, although food fraud can take various forms, such as adulteration or substitution, the new rules will ensure that when a food is not exactly what it appears to be, relevant information will be provided to prevent consumers from being misled by a certain presentation or appearance. When some ingredients, normally expected to be in the food, have been replaced by others, the substitute ingredients will be labelled prominently on the package and not only in the list of ingredients. For foods implying or indicating a false origin, the new rules set certain criteria to ensure that voluntary origin indications do not mislead consumers. Operators who make origin claims are required to provide further information so that people know where the characterising ingredient of the food actually comes from and not just the last country where the food was processed.
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Of course, origin labelling is not enough to counter another adulteration scandal and so, in addition to the above legislation, the Commission has also introduced new measures to enhance the EU control system as a whole. The intention is to improve the mechanisms for 
B. The Industry Response
Given that food business operators bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety and authenticity of their food it is worth considering the industry response to the crisis. Large retailers, in particular, have always had a strong influence on the regulation and content of
[t]he current industry focus on developing shorter supply chains and on sourcing locally produced foods in long term partnerships is of enormous importance in terms of having a more resilient, higher integrity UK food system (…) However, we cannot escape the need to actively participate in global food supply systems and must develop a new mentality when sourcing from sometimes highly complex international markets.
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Given Tesco's high-profile involvement in the scandal their response was eagerly anticipated.
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Tesco issued a widely publicised apology assuring its customers that it would find out what had gone wrong. After subsequent investigations the company concluded that the burger supplier was not on the list of approved suppliers nor was the meat from the UK or Ireland. Tesco promised to cut all links with the supplier in question and introduced a "comprehensive system of DNA testing across our meat products".
Following this apology Tesco launched a "farm and factory" (now mostly aimed at children) website as part of its plans to open up its supply chains to customers. 115 Chief Executive, Philip Clarke promised that "we will take you right the way into the farms and the factories.
We'll allow you to see who the farmers are, how they produce for us [and] the care and attention that I know that they take". 116 Tesco was awarded the 2013 CorpComm Prize for crisis management for its response to the scandal as it "showed grace under fire. It was clear on its objectives and it delivered". 117 The company was, in particular, praised for its three simple promises of putting in place better controls, bringing food closer to home and building better relationships with the farmer.
Beyond industry self-congratulation, PR management, and CSR initiatives, Tesco has taken some concrete steps to prevent a future scandal. The company has introduced DNA testing checks to "set a new standard", created a new supplier list and reduced the number of abattoirs it uses. 118 Tesco also announced that it is undertaking a "forensic" examination of its food safety standard in the retailer's product specifications is not enough". 123 Of course, private regulation is insufficient in itself and so new forms of co-regulation between the public and private spheres have been adopted. A notable development has been the emergence of a "supply chain" approach to ensuring food safety. This approach essentially involves the inclusion of the entire supply chain but especially retailers in monitoring the safety of products. It was precisely on this approach that the existing EU food safety regulation was based, largely as a result of earlier international food scares such as BSE and dioxin. 124 In the aftermath of the scandal there were immediate calls for the perpetrators of the fraud to be brought to justice. In fact, little has come of such calls. There have been very few successful prosecutions resulting from the scandal and none at all in Ireland, although one is pending. 125 What the prosecutions do show is that for many involved in the industry fraudulent practices were almost considered part and parcel of the ordinary course of business.
In the UK none of the prosecutions actually involved the deliberate mislabelling of foreign horsemeat as beef. It is, however, worth looking at the prosecutions brought against
Peter Boddy and David Moss to gain an understanding of what was happening. They admitted to a number of charges indirectly relating to the horsemeat scandal. Boddy was convicted on two counts for failing to comply with food traceability requirements. Moss received a four-month prison sentence, suspended for two years, and Boddy was fined GBP 4,000 for each count. Boddy was the owner of a slaughterhouse in Todmorden, West
Yorkshire which sold horse meat to customers (this was a legitimate part of his business).
However, he sold 55 carcasses without keeping any record of where they were going and 37 of these he claimed went to Italian restaurants in the UK. A further 17 animals entered his business without documents showing where they had come from. There was, however, no proof the pair had deliberately tried to pass horsemeat off as beef. The judge noted that the two men were not being sentenced for any role they might have played in the fraudulent substitution of horsemeat for beef in the consumer market but said that:
[i]t is impossible to avoid a suspicion, even a strong one, that behind the activities disclosed by this investigation was some degree of complicity, together with othersthose who sold the live horses to the abattoir, and those who received the horse meat thereafter -in putting into the human food chain, under the guise of some other meat, what was in fact horse meat.
There were also a number of prosecutions brought in the Netherlands, including that of Jans The only Dutch conviction so far is that of horsemeat trader Willy Selten, the owner of Willy Selten BV based in the Netherlands. On 7 April 2015 Selten was found guilty of falsifying documents and jailed for two and a half years for his role in the horsemeat scandal.
He had been arrested in May 2013 for selling 300 tonnes of horsemeat labelled as beef (the horsemeat had been sourced in the Netherlands, UK and Ireland in 2011 and 2012). He was found guilty of forging invoices, labels and declarations and using forged documents to sell meat. 129 He had been mixing horsemeat with beef and selling it as 100 percent beef.
Prosecutors said the horsemeat was processed as beef at the company's headquarters in Oss.
The Dutch Authorities had taken 167 samples from his meat supplies in February 2013 and 35 of these tested positive for horse DNA. Some 132 companies across Europe that purchased meat from Mr Selten have been ordered to trace it and remove it from sale if it has not yet been consumed.
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this article we asked whether the EU's food safety regime or the Treaty provisions on free movement of goods were in any way responsible for the scandal. The
Commission was adamant that they did not play a role. We disagree in part. The EU rules on free movement created an opportunity for unscrupulous operators to operate. Considerable faith was placed in the quality of products moving within the EU. Further, the Internal Market may have incentivised the fraud in that those involved had access to a larger market.
The price war between supermarkets also seems to have been an incentive to seek cheaper products in other Member States. In addition, the regulatory regime at the time had been set up to respond to the last crisis, the BSE crisis, which concerned food safety not the longstanding and well known issue of food fraud. Indeed, in relation to earlier crises involving BSE and dioxin (the contamination of food products, mainly eggs and chickens in Belgium with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) and dioxin), "[i]t was a widely expressed concern at the time of the food scares [BSE and dioxin in the 1990s] that, as a result of economic globalisation and trade liberalisation, the EU would advance powerful industry interests at the expense of public health and consumer interests". 130 The revised regulatory regime introduced in the wake of the scandal was never originally intended to deal with the issue of fraudulent adulteration. Although it is perhaps too early to tell, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the new scheme will ultimately fail to prevent fraud on the scale that occurred during the horsemeat scandal. It is now clear that although EU free movement rules may contribute to creating the problem, EU food law does not adequately address it due to the continued over-emphasis on safety as opposed to fraud.
There have already been reports of emerging fish adulteration scandals. 131 Complex supply chains are simply here to stay particularly in relation to frozen or processed meat products which of necessity involve multiple suppliers. The reality is that only a multidimensional strategy is suitable for combating fraud. At EU level this would require a greater emphasis on the regulation of food fraud as opposed to just food safety, including the strengthening of traceability requirements. At national level the penalties need to be serious and backed up by a well-resourced enforcement strategy. 
